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7 'Peaceful Rise' and China's new 
international contract 
The state in change in transnational society 
Chengxin Pan 
N early three decades of breakneck economic growth have profoundly altered 
China's economic, social, cultural and political landscapes (Watson 1992; Tu 
1993; F. Wang 1998; Tang 2005; Gittings 2005). Yet, despite these remark-
able changes in China, many observers have identified evidence of major 
continuity. Domestically, the continuity is clearly reflected in the continued 
reign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the international level, it is 
related to a possible repetition of the recurring tragedy of great power poli-
tics (Mearsheimer 2001). Given that violent clashes between predominant 
status quo powers and their emerging challengers have been characteristic of 
international history, many realists believe that China's rise is no exception 
to this 'pattern. Consequently, the image of a Chinese dragon as a 'fire-
breather', as former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) 
puts it, is creating 'a cauldron of anxiety' among the rest of the world. 
Against this backdrop, partly in response to such widespread anxiety, China 
spelt out a strategy called 'Peaceful Rise' (heping jueqi) in late 2003. 1 
Apparently aimed at reassuring the international community of China's 
peaceful intent, still this new strategy is greeted with much scepticism. As 
Zoellick (2005) notes, 'Uncertainties about how China will use its power will 
lead the United States - and others as well - to hedge relations with China. 
Many countries hope China will pursue a "Peaceful Rise", but none will bet 
their future on it'. For all its claim to a peaceful rise, China is thus seen by 
many as no different from previous rising major powers, notably Germany 
and Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Against such hunches about continuities, I suggest in this chapter that there 
have been a lot more fluidities and changes in terms of both China's domestic 
politics and international orientations, through a close examination of the 
'Peaceful Rise' strategy. The notion of 'Peaceful Rise', I argue, denotes a new 
international contract,2 so to speak, being struck between the Beijing regime 
and transnational actors. Within this contractual framework, the Chinese 
government promises responsible and peaceful foreign behaviour in accordance 
with international norms, in exchange for a largely favourable and stable 
international environment in which China could continue its rise or economic 
development. China of course insists that it has always behaved peacefully 
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and responsibly in the international realm. But what is new in its 'Peaceful 
Rise' discourse, I argue, is Beijing's growing acceptance of international respon-
sibilityas defined by mainstream transnational actors, rather than on its own 
terms (as was previously the case). This ready acceptance of obligation, lar-
gely externally defined, is linked to changes in broader arenas, as many 
transnational actors have become instrumental in China's economic fortune 
and emerged as a new, if indirect, source of political legitimacy for the 
Chinese regime. Thus this new international contract, based on the changing 
meanings of state responsibility and legitimacy, reflects a transformation not 
only in China's international relations, but also in the Chinese state itself 
This chapter focuses on how such changes in the Chinese state have taken 
place, as exemplified in the domestic-global nexus underlining the formula-
tion of the 'Peaceful Rise' strategy. In her study of the constitutive relation-
ship between national interests and international society, Martha Finnemore 
(1996: 136) suggests that 'the particular form of the state is a result of both 
international and local factors'. This observation, I would say, applies also to 
the Chinese state in change. At one level, 'Peaceful Rise' was driven by 
domestic processes one of which was the regime's desire to carve out a new 
national identity and maintain domestic legitimacy. At the same time, such 
domestic processes are intersected with processes outside China's 'bound-
. ~ 
aries', so a better understanding of the change requires that the constitutive 
role played by the transnational ,society and its relevant components are 
addressed. Not only does transnational society often provide the backdrop of 
the 'Other' against which the Chinese state (re)defines its interests and iden-
tity, but, more importantly, multiple actors within transnational society, 
through their images, practices and interactions with Chinese 'domestic' 
actors, are constantly compiicit in the production and reproduction of China 
as a state. As Gupta (1995: 377) points out, 'any theory of the state needs to 
take into account its constitution through a complex set of spatially inter-
secting representations and practices'. 
Given the limitations of space, in this chapter I shall concentrate on the 
transnational dimension when discussing the emergence of the 'Peaceful 
Rise' strategy and its revelation of a state in change. This does not mean that 
domestic actors do not play an important part or that their role can be 
neatly detached from the transnational processes. Rather, I contend that only 
by examining the transnational context - and by clarifying the interactions 
between the transnational and the domestic - can we better appreciate the 
role of multiple domestic actors. This chapter cannot, nor does it purport to, 
provide a comprehensive answer to the question of why the Chinese state 
undergoes change the way it does - regarding its choice of strategy in pro-
jecting an international image. Instead, it only serves to catch a glimpse of 
the discursive nature as well as the fluidity of China as a state (Li 2006b), 
which, like all states, should be understood as nothing more than 'a histori-
cally constituted and constantly reconstituted form of political life' (Walker 
1993: 46). 
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In what follows, I shall first examine how 'Peaceful Rise' embodies some 
significant changes in terms of the Chinese state's legitimacy base and its 
responsibility. Drawing on the 'state-in-society' approach (Migdal 2001), I 
shall survey how those changes have been effected by the constitutive influ-
ence of various transnational actors. Finally, I conclude that 'Peaceful Rise' 
is as much a foreign policy initiative of the Chinese government as it is a 
social construct ji'Dln transnational society, an understanding which is con-
tingent on our interpretation regarding what China's 'rise' may mean for the 
world. 
Expanding the social contract: 'Peaceful Rise' and a state in change 
On the surface, 'Peaceful Rise' is primarily a foreign policy statement aimed 
at reassuring the outside world of China's peaceful intent and the non-vio-
lent nature of its economic expansion. The phrase was first used 'by former 
Vice-President of the Central Party School Zheng Bijian, now chairman of 
the government-affiliated think-tank China Reform Forum. In November 
2003, in his address to a plenary session of the Boao Forum in China's 
Hainan province, Zheng (2003) stated that China has blazed a new strategic 
path which is 'peaceful rise through independently building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather than detaching from 
economic globalization'. Once coined, the phrase was quickly endorsed by 
the top Chinese leadership, appearing both in Premier Wen liabao's speech 
at Harvard University in December 2003, and in President Hu Jintao's 
address at the forum marking Mao Zedong's 110th birthday (Wen 2003; Hu 
Jintao 2003). As far as Beijing is concerned, the notion of 'Peaceful Rise', 
which appears to be both an accurate description of China's developmental 
trajectory hitherto and a sensible strategy for the future, can be employed to 
reinforce a positive image of the Chinese state in international society. This 
image, as Wen liabao told his audience at Harvard University, portrays 
China as 'a country in reform and opening-up and a rising power dedicated 
to peace' (Wen 2003). 
In this context, the international scholarly community has often treated 
'Peaceful Rise' as a new foreign policy paradigm (Medeiros 2004; Suettinger 
2004; Sutter 2004; Jia 2005), raising questions such as: Can it work? Will 
China be able to rise peacefully, even if such is the intention? To what extent 
is it new? While these questions - all focusing on the policy itself - are 
important to ponder, what has been less fully recognised is that 'Peaceful 
Rise' also reveals significant change in the Chinese state itself - a new social 
contract on the horizon. It is well known that since the beginning of the 
'reform and opening' policy in the late 1970s, the Chinese state has been 
predicated on 'an unwritten social contract between the party and the people 
where the people do not compete with the party for political power as long 
as the party looks after their economic fortunes' (Breslin 2005: 749). Today, 
what is implied in 'Peaceful Rise' is the expansion of that social contract 
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from a domestic to a transnational level, in which China makes an explicit 
commitment to 'peace' to reassure the international community, which in 
return could continue facilitating China's 'rise' or economic development. 
Two changes are observed here. The first is the expansion of state respon-
sibility from serving the people to serving transnational capitaL To be sure, 
this is not the first time that China has stressed its role as a peace-loving, 
responsible member of the interstate system. As Richard Bernstein and Ross 
Munro (1997: 51) pointed out, the slogan 'We will never seek hegemony' is 
'one of the few that has remained in use in China as the country passed 
through its various political stages'. But that slogan largely expresses a 
'passive' attitude, outlining what China will not do. 'Peaceful Rise', on the 
other hand, explicitly underlines what China will do - maintain peace. This 
suggests a growing recognition in the Chinese leadership that in the globali-
sation era peace means more than the absence of conflict, but requires its 
own explicit acceptance of international norms and active participation in 
the maintenance of the international order. As a consequence, the leadership 
is no longer as suspicious of US global hegemony as in the past. In the 
words of Zheng Bijian (2005), the CCP 'does not intend to challenge the 
existing international order, let alone to break it by violent forces'. 
Consequently, 'Peaceful Rise' not only is a foreign policy initiative but 
also indicates a new official discourse on state responsibility. For example, 
speaking at the APEC Chief Executive Officers' Summit in November 2004, 
President Hu Jintao promised that the Chinese government would 'create 
new ways of attracting foreign investment, and push. for greater reform in 
government administrative system by building a predictable and more trans-
parent management system for sectors open to foreign investment' (quoted in 
Jia Qingguo 2005: 498). Another example of this new discourse of responsi-
bility is the unusual manner in which Chinese authorities conducted their 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) entry negotiations. In order to fast-track 
the negotiations and accelerate China's entry, the chief negotiator Long 
Yongtu and other negotiators were instructed to insulate themselves not only 
from Chinese interested parties, but even from their own colleagues in Beijing 
(Breslin 2004: 665). In a sense, this reveals the extraordinary lengths to which 
the Chinese leaders have gone in order to meet international 'obligations' and 
be seen as 'responsible' players in the international economic system. 
Associated with this new sense of responsibility, the second change embo-
died in 'Peaceful Rise' is a broadened legitimacy base for the state. Within 
the 'Peaceful Rise' discourse, two sources of legitimacy for the Chinese gov-
ernment are evident, one domestic and the other transnational, which are 
intertwined through Beijing's fixation on economic development. While 
partly designed to boost domestic legitimacy, economic development has led 
to deepening ties between China and the outside world. As a result, in the 
eyes of the Chinese government, by playing an increasingly significant role in 
the Chinese economy, transnational actors have become also important for 
the state's legitimacy and political survival. 
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This added role comes as an unintended consequence of transnational 
actors' participation in China's economy. However, as many transnational 
actors directly benefit from China's economic boom, some ha~e come to 
openly endorse the performance of the Chinese government. The interna-
tional business community, for instance, has increasingly looked favourably 
at China as a valuable trading partner and investment destination, even to 
the point of treating it as 'the leading neoliberal poster country' (Hart-
Landsberg and· Burkett 2004). The president of the world's largest media 
company Time Warner once praised China as 'an ideal cooperative partner 
in the global economy' in terms of its steady economic growth and good 
prospects (quoted in Knight 2003: 330). Perhaps nowhere is the international 
acceptance of the Chinese state more evident than the warm reception its 
leaders now receive abroad. A recent example is Hu Jintao's April 2006 visit 
to the US, where on one occasion he was treated to a lavish banquet at 
Microsoft Chief Bill Gates' $100 million lakeside mansion in Seattle. 
Executives from Starbucks, Costco, Weyerhaeuser and Amazon.com were 
among the guests, 'all eager to show the Chinese leader their appreciation for 
his efforts in providing American businesses with an ample supply of cheap 
labor, a stable currency exchange and an affable investment climate' (Kwong 
2006: 1). 
Not only has Beijing gained more respect in the business world, but it is 
making friends far and wide among world leaders as well. When Hu Jintao 
visited France in 2004, French President Jacques Chirac had the Eiffel Tower 
illuminated red in his honour. And his visit to Australia in 2003, as one 
commentator put it, 'was such a sanitized affair that he seemed to be visiting 
a vassal state' (Seth 2005: 8). For a country highly sensitive to 'face' and 
national image, increasing global acceptance thus provides an additional 
layer of legitimacy for the Chinese government, both on the world stage and 
in the eyes of local political and economic elites. By this, I do not mean that 
the Chinese government and transnational actors have completely con-
verged, as the fine details of the 'international contract' are often open to 
different interpretations and contestations. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
international business has now become integral to the state's legitimacy; this 
in itself constitutes a remarkable change in the ways in which the Chinese 
state has traditionally legitimised itself. 
The changing ways in which state responsibility and legitimacy are per-
ceived by the Chinese leaders underline the changing nature of the Chinese 
state, especially in terms of the ways it operates and functions in various aspects 
of Chinese political and economic life. For example, Chinese cadres at almost 
every level have come to realise that their career advancement is linked to 
their ability to attract foreign investment (Zha 2005: 784). In this context, it 
is not difficult to imagine the implications for other dimensions of work, 
such as 'party construction' (dangjian) and 'political and ideological work' 
(sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo), as well as for the organisation and operation of 
the party~state more broadly. In 2000, even before the formal articulation of 
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the 'Peaceful Rise' strategy, the tectonic plate of party politics had already 
begun to shift, as the CCP rewrote its mission statement in the order of the 
so-called 'Three Represents' (sange daibiao).3 In 2001, the CCP amended its 
constitution for the first time to open its membership to private entrepre-
neurs. Noting the significance of this change for China, a RAND analyst 
wrote: 
The defining event in China in the first year of the 21st century is prob-
ably not the aircraft collision near Hainan and its aftermath, or the trial 
and release of Chinese-American scholars, or the repression of the 
Falun Gong, or the award of the 2008 Olympics to Beijing. The defining 
event is the decision of the Chinese leadership to admit capitalists as 
members of the Communist Party. This decision raises the possibility of 
Communists co-opting capitalists - or of capitalists co-opting the party. 
(Wolf 2001: A17) 
Whether it is communists co-opting capitalists or the other way round, what 
is not in doubt is a party-state in historic transition, as a China committed to 
'Peaceful Rise' seeks to redefine its legitimacy, responsibility and identity vis-
a-vis market, capital, great global powers and its own people. What is ironic 
is that 'Peaceful Rise' is aimed primarily at the stability and continuity of the 
state; but, to that end, the state has been compelled to significantly trans-
form itself One may indeed argue that the apparent continuity of having the 
CCP in power in China merely masks the abundance and depth of change, 
to which the next section now turns. 
The transnational sources of China's 'rise' and state legitimacy 
In one way or another, changes in contemporary China tend to be linked to 
its economic development since the late 1970s. This economic miracle, in 
turn, had its origins in the end of the decade-long Cultural Revolution in 
1976. Those upheavals not only devastated the Chinese economy and social 
life, but al-so significantly alienated the political leadership from much of 
Chinese society (Goldman et al. 1993). With the foundation of state legiti-
macy seriously weakened, the image and practice of the state badly needed a 
facelift to reclaim its political mandate. It was against this background that 
the reformist camp led by Deng Xiaoping came to the fore. Effectively 
replacing the old doctrine of 'class struggle' with the immediately pragmatic 
appeal that <getting rich is glorious', the reformers set China on a path of 
economic rehabilitation, reform and development. 
From the outset, the economic reform was aimed not at bringing about 
fundamental change in the state's political structure, but, quite the opposite, 
at keeping it largely intact - by way of a 'mundane' objective of continually 
raising people's living standards. In this sense, it can be said that China's rise 
owes much to the desire of the CCP to stay in power, as well as to various 
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sub-state and local actors, and China's indigenous conditions, such as low 
wages, low costs, high savings rates and, some would add, Confucian culture. 
And yet these constitute only part of the complex picture of the rise of China. 
As the country's integration with the outside world deepens, local initiatives 
are increasingly inseparable from transnational influences. Consequently, the 
picture cannot be completed unless we bring in transnational actors and 
understand their roles in China's economic development. Thus far, two con-
ditions are especially noteworthy for the country's impressive economic per-
formance: a favourable international economic environment and a normative 
change on the part of the Chinese leadership in its attitudes towards the free 
market and the capitalist economic system in general. In both respects, as will 
be illustrated in this chapter, transnational actors have played a significant 
role. 
First, transnational actors contribute to China's rise through the channels 
of investment, trade and technology transfer. Increasing access to global 
capital, foreign markets and production know-how has been instrumental in 
China's soaring economic growth. As Nicholas Lardy (2003: 1) suggests, the 
volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into China has been a key 
'indicator of its economic rise'. In 1979 China passed a joint venture law, 
signalling its intention to open its economy to foreign investment. In order to 
attract investment, the following year it created four special economic zones 
on its southeast coast. Although the initial inflows of foreign investment 
were modest, it was those special economic zones, where about 90 per cent 
of FOI went between 1986 and 1999, that helped jumpstart China's eco-
nomic growth. To date, tens of thousands of corporations from 190 countries 
and regions have invested in China, which include 450 of the Fortune global 
top 500 multinational corporations (Xinhua News Agency 2006). Since 
1993, it has consistently been the largest recipient of FOI among developing 
countries. Annual net FOI inflows into China grew from US$1 billion in 
1985 to US$52.7 billion by 2002, the year when it overtook the US to 
become the world's largest FOI destination (Li 2005: 435; Hart-Landsberg 
and Burkett 2004: 13). 
Like foreign investment, China's export-led economy is also at the centre 
of its remarkable success story. Foreign trade as a share of GOP increased 
from 12.68 per cent in 1980 to 60.3 per cent in 2003 (Xu Jianguo 2004), 
making the country a major export centre in East Asia. With most FOI in 
China going to the manufacturing sector, the export activities of foreign 
transnational corporations are becoming increasingly crucial to China's eco-
nomic growth (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004: 48~9). In 2003, foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs) accounted for 55.81 per cent of all Chinese 
exports, or close to 70 per cent if domestic Chinese producers who produce 
under contract for export using foreign components are included (Breslin 
2005: 743). Thus Stephen Roach at Morgan Stanley argues that 'the vigor of 
Chinese export growth has come far more from the deliberate outsourcing 
strategies of western multinational companies than from the rapid growth of 
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indigenous Chinese companies' (quoted in Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
2004: 83). 
As foreign trade as a share of China's GOP grows, so does the importance 
of the foreign market for the Chinese economy. This is especially true with 
the American market. During the booming decade of the American econ-
omy between 1991 and 2001, the United States acted as a 'dynamic absorber 
of East Asian manufactured products, which were a main source of eco-
nomic growth in export-oriented East Asian countries', including China 
(Ohashi 2005: 72). Such access to overseas markets has helped produce, 
among other things, a huge trade surplus for the Chinese economy, whose 
foreign currency reserves have recently passed the US$l trillion milestone. 
Consequently, the 'FDI trade nexus', as Ohashi (2005: 71) notes, has been 
'boosting economic growth in China since the early 1990s and resulted in 
China becoming the "factory of the world" and the world's largest supplier 
of sixty -six products in ten manufacturing industries in 200 I' . 
Meanwhile, Western, especially US, technology has also made an impor-
tant contribution. In the mid-nineteenth century, European science and 
technology were one of the first things that shocked the Middle Kingdom 
and opened its eyes to the outside world. Since the late 1970s, science and 
technology were once again back on the state policy agenda. As Newsweek 
contributing editor Robert 1. Samuelson (2004: A21) wrote, China wants to 
be 'more than the world's sweatshop' and so it wants to attract not only 
investment, but also technology. In 1984 alone, over 1,000 contracts were 
signed to import advanced Western technology and equipment (Stoessinger 
1994: 110). Meanwhile, China's scholarly exchange programme in the early 
reform period enabled foreign countries to transfer technology to China on a 
scale triple that of the comparable programme in the 1950s (Harding 1987: 
155). And thanks to the inflows of FDI, foreign investors have now estab-
lished more than 700 research and development centres across the country 
(Xinhua News Agency 2006). 
Of course, in all these processes we should not overlook the active role 
played by the Chinese state and numerous local actors. Without their initia-
tives and cooperation, transnational forces, be they foreign investment or the 
market, cannot on their own steer China's transformation. As Wang Hui 
(2003: 119) notes, 'the actualities of market economics and the process of 
globalization cannot be implemented other than by state intervention'. In 
this sense, the state has indeed played the role of 'midwife of capitalism' 
(Robison and Goodman 1996: 4). Having said that, I argue that the Chinese 
state did not take on this role as a matter of course; rather, this has been 
largely a result of a cognitive learning process. While the state was keen to 
revive its economy in order to salvage its waning legitimacy, it had no 
readymade blueprint at hand, and had no choice but to adopt a highly 
pragmatic approach. As Deng Xiaoping once explained: 'We are engaged in 
an experiment. For us, it [reform] is something new, and we have to grope 
around to find our way' (quoted in Harding 1987: 87). Given this 'ideational 
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vacuum', the Chinese state understood that it was in need of new ideas and 
norms to liberate thought Uicfang sixiang) so as to carry out the monu-
mental task of economic reform, or the 'second revolution' as Deng once 
aptly described it. 
This is where transnational actors' normative influence comes in. Indeed, 
if we are to understand the ideational forces behind China's rise, the fact 
should not be lost that China's economic reform has largely coincided with 
the ascendancy of neoliberalism on the world stage as the new economic 
orthodoxy known as the 'Washington Consensus'. Deng's 'let some get rich 
first (so others can follow suit)' is widely credited with helping unleash 
China's force of production. But this doctrine, for all its apparent 'Chinese 
characteristics', has a conspicuous international pedigree. As Peter Kwong 
(2006: 1) points out, if Deng's slogan 'sounds like Ronald Reagan's neo-
liberal "trickle down economics", it's because that's exactly what it is: both 
Ronald Reagan and Deng Xiaoping were great fans of the neoliberal guru 
Milton Friedman'. Indeed, as Kwong recalled, there was a great public fan-
fare among Chinese liberal intellectuals when Friedman first visited China in 
1980. His lecture given at the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference was attended not only by intellectuals and ministerial-level offi-
cials, but also by top Communist Party leaders (Kwong 2006: 1). 
Friedman was not the only neoliberal thinker who captivated Chinese 
leaders and intellectuals; Friedrich von Hayek was another. The joint winner 
of the 1974 Nobel Prize for Economics argued that because governments 
always receive limited information, they should not interfere with the mar-
ket's spontaneous order. His book The Road to SCI/dom was treated as a 
classic and its Chinese version sold tens of thousands of copies (Terrill 2006: 
15).4 According to one of China's most influential public intellectuals, 
Hayek's theory was instrumental in China's decision to gradually dismantle 
the economic structure of central planning and to accord market forces a 
decisive role (Wang Hui 2003: 120). The Hayekian idea of 'small govern-
ment, big society' (xiao zhcngfu, da shchui) has now been internalised as an 
almost sacred principle in China, underpinning a range of social and eco-
nomic reforms in areas such as health care, housing, state-owned enterprises 
and the financial system. 
In a similar vein, the neoliberal notion of export and the attraction of FDI 
as key components of successful development has been dutifully observed in 
China since the early days of its reform. Indeed, it was the faith in the cen-
trality of FDI in economic growth that was behind China's determination to 
join the WTO, especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-8 
when FDI activities stagnated across the region (Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett 2004: 49). In a widely circulated article, Long Yongtu (1999) 
explained that joining the organisation is necessary for China to become part 
of mainstream international society. The chief negotiator for WTO entry 
insisted that 'China's economy must become a market economy in order to 
become part of the global economic system, as well as the economic 
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globalization process' (quoted in Lardy 2002: 21). Predictably, the process of 
joining the WTO further intensified China's 'socialisation' into the global 
economic system. Given its role in China's WTO entry, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was at the forefront 
of such socialisation. In recent years, institutional norms within MOFTEC 
have become 'increasingly aligned with the norms of the international 
regime, and its officials became the strongest advocates within the govern-
ment of China's adoption of international practices' (Pearson 2001: 355). 
Such changes, as Pearson (2001: 355-6) notes, would have been unlikely 
without pressure from US and European negotiators in the lead-up to WTO 
entry, for most of those changes had 110t been considered seriously by 
Chinese officials back in the 1980s. 
As cognitive learning and normative change pave the way for China's 
economic integration with the international system, integration in turn helps 
accelerate its economic expansion. The rapid growth in China's foreign trade 
in the immediate aftermath of its accession to the WTO exceeded already 
high expectations. Within three years, China surpassed Japan to become the 
world's third largest trading nation in 2004. In the meantime, its outward 
FDI also gathered pace, with the average annual investment (in 160 coun-
tries) rising nearly tenfold from the 1980s to US$3 billion during the four 
years of 2000-3 (Zhang 2005: x, 5). 
To the extent that various transnational actors are behind this economic 
expansion, there has been 'an ideational acceptance' among Chinese autho-
rities that 'dependence on the capitalist global economy is the best or at least 
the quickest way of promoting economic growth' (Breslin 2005: 749). After 
all, underlying this acceptance is a growing recognition within the key state 
actors of the important contribution of transnational actors to the main-
tenance of the state's legitimacy. For the most part, transnational society is 
interested not in boosting the legitimacy of the Chinese state per se, but 
rather in taking advantage of the commercial opportunity on offer, with 
. some even harbouring the hope of a Chinese democracy along the way. And 
yet, in practice, by contributing to China's economic development transna-
tional society has, if only unwittingly, helped enhance the state's legitimacy. 
Transnational actors, norm diffusion and China's 'peace' 
commitment 
Insofar as the state's legitimacy has been boosted by its engagement with 
transnational actors, it is logical that the government would want to behave 
more 'responsibly' in the international realm - that is, to meet somewhat the 
international expectations of it. In this sense, its commitment to peace 
should also be seen as a transnational construct. Sure, such a commitment 
has its roots in Beijing's domestic concern with economic development and 
internal stability, a concern which is increasingly shared by a new middle 
class in China. Nevertheless, I argue that China's renewed sense of international 
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responsibility cannot be fully explained unless we also take into account the 
constitutive influence of international normative structures on the Chinese 
state. 
By international normative structures, I refer to two types of discursive or 
normative structures at the transnational level, one of a realist stripe, the 
other of a liberal persuasion. The realist normative structure is characterised 
by an overriding strategic concern with what realists see as the highly desta-
bilising effect of a rising great power on the international system. The liberal 
structure, meanwhile, is based on a belief in the state's cognitive learning " 
capacity and the inherent malleability of state preferences and interests in an 
interdependent and increasingly institutionalised world. Accordingly, these 
structures have two distinct sets of questions about China, with the former 
centring on how better to respond to an almost inevitable China threat, and the 
latter asking how better to facilitate 'positive' change in China (Mearsheimer 
and Brzezinski 2005: 46-50). As will be illustrated below, by way of their 
different images and practices both structures have shaped, in one way or 
another, China's renewed 'peace' commitment. 
Associated with the realist normative structure is its 'China threat' image. 
With a long dominance in international politics, realism sees the world as an 
anarchical system in which states are engaged in a constant struggle for 
power or supremacy. From this perspective, with the demise of the Soviet 
'evil empire', China emerged as its natural successor in this 'dangerous' 
world. An early example of this 'China threat' argument can be found in 
Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis, which portrays an 
emerging threat from a Confucian-Islamic alliance to the Christian West 
(Huntington 1993). What has followed is an explosion of 'China threat' dis-
courses, in which China is seen variously as a cultural, military, economic, 
environmental, resource or ideological threat, or various combinations of 
those aspects. The China threat image, moreover, is never far away from the 
policy of containment strenuously advocated and implemented by hardline 
commentators and practitioners, particularly in the United States (Pan 
2004). Even with the US preoccupied with the 'war on terror', the Pentagon 
has continued to see China as having 'the greatest potential to compete 
militarily with the United States' (U.S. Department of Defense 2006: 29). 
This China image and the containment policy based upon it thus con-
stitute an international environment that is potentially detrimental to China's 
economic development and, by extension, its legitimacy. How to address this 
international concern over China's rise becomes 'one of the most important 
challenges China has been facing since the mid-1990s' (Jia Qingguo 2005: 
493). Having tried without success to dismiss the 'China threat' argument, 
Beijing has resorted to reinventing its 'peace' image and commitment. Jiang 
Chang bin, Director of the Central Party School's Centre for International 
Strategic Studies, provides a telling account of how the discursive practice of 
the 'China threat' at the international level relates to the birth of 'Peaceful 
Rise' in China. He suggests that it was against the backdrop of the heated 
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debate over the 'China threat' that a research team led by Zheng Bijian was 
assembled to study the 'Peaceful Rise' project. After all, he argues, 'we 
cannot tolerate the continued absence of our own voice' in that global debate 
(Jiang Changbin 2005: 46). Zheng Bijian himself added weight to this 
explanation in an interview in 2004. He said that his determination to 
explore 'Peaceful Rise' was aroused after his trip in December 2002 to the 
US, where he encountered first hand the ubiquitous presence of the 'China 
threat' and 'China collapse' arguments (see Zheng and Tok 2005). 
However, the realist structure alone cannot satisfactorily account for 
China's revamped 'peace' commitment. Otherwise we are unable to fully to 
explain why 'Peaceful Rise' emerged in late 2003 when the 'China threat' 
theory, though still visible, had largely subsided and been overshadowed by 
America's fear of terrorism. Indeed, if the 'China threat' image and practice 
were the only significant point of reference for Chinese policy-makers, the 
latter could well have come up with equally hostile rhetoric and response, as 
is frequently suggested in the notion of 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. 
Thus, while realism might have provided some direct impetus for the 
emergence of the notion of 'Peaceful Rise' per se, to the extent that 'Peaceful 
Rise' signifies a new international contract for the Chinese state it should be 
seen as more than a counterargument against the realist construction. 
Rather, as Beijing's repeated efforts to join the WTO can attest, this peace 
commitment has a deeper normative root. On the eve of China's accession to 
the WTO, Long Yongtu reassured the international community that 'China 
will be a responsible member that will playa constructive role, abide by the 
rules, and do its best to contribute to the improvement of the multilateral 
trading system' (People's Daily 2001a). In a speech to an economic forum 
attended by foreign delegates in March 2001, then Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao 
highlighted the 'important changes' already made to the Chinese govern-
ment's functions and responsibilities. As he put it, 'economic globalization 
does not imply less government responsibility and role. In the process of 
participating in economic globalization, the Chinese government will shoulder 
the responsibilities, further convert its functions, and improve the way for 
playing its role' (quoted in Knight 2003: 331). These statements clearly demon-
strate that since the mid- to late 1990s China's attitudes towards international 
institutions have shifted from suspicion and indifference to enthusiastic par-
ticipation and a heightened sense of responsibility. 
Such a 'thick' commitment to peace can best be explained as a result of 
transnational norm diffusion, a process in which liberal international norms, 
institutions and actors help to reshape Chinese perceptions of global politics 
and attitudes towards international norms. There has now been a steady stream 
of literature on norm diffusion and changes in China's foreign behaviour (Foot 
2000; Zhang 2003; Carlson 2005; H. Wang 2003). In the pages that follow, I 
want to sketch out some of the major transnational actors, channels and 
processes through which liberal norm diffusion in relation to China's 'peace' 
commitment has occurred and state responsibility has been reconstructed. 
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Tlte United States 
The United States is arguably the most important single international actor 
in China's global perceptual change. Given its continued dominance on the 
world stage and the importance of its vast market for China's exports, 
among other things, it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that a US con-
structive engagement of China is essential to the formation and continuation 
of an international environment conducive to China's development. In this 
equation, to be sure, the US is not the only state actor that matters; other 
Western powers as well as China's neighbours have played a similar role. Nor 
is the United States a unitary actor; hardline US rhetoric and policy on 
China are rarely in short supply. Nevertheless, overall the foreign policy 
establishment of recent US administrations has followed a largely neol\beral 
policy of 'constructive engagement'. This should not be surprising, given that 
'to change China' has been seen as a major goal and responsibility of 
Western liberals all along (Spence 1969). Madeleine Albright (1998), for 
example, has argued that 'the manner in which we engage China will have an 
important bearing on whether China becomes integrated as a constructive 
participant in international institutions'. Similarly, Condoleezza Rice insisted 
that 'Knowing that China has the potential for good or bad, ... it is our 
responsibility to try and push and prod and persuade China to a more 
positive course' (Kessler 2005: A16). 
Given such open desire to promote change in the Middle Kingdom, a link 
between China's 'positive course' and US engagement is not difficult to discern. 
For instance, 'Peaceful Rise' was first floated at a time when the Bush 11' 
administration, preoccupied with its 'war on telTor', quietly discarded its earlier 
designation of China as a 'strategic competitor' and treated it once again as 
a partner. More precisely, Zheng Bijian's 'Peaceful Rise' speech in November 
2003 was delivered two months after then US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
unequivocally asserted that 'U.S. relations with China are the best they have 
been since President Nixon's first visit in 1972' (Kessler 2003: AI5). In 
December 2003, visiting Chinese Premier Wen 1iabao made his 'Peaceful Rise' 
speech at Harvard one day after George W Bush declared that Washington and 
Beijing were now 'partners in diplomacy' and bluntly warned Taiwan that he 
opposed any attempt to unilaterally change its relationship with the mainland 
(Sanger 2003). In both cases, the message of 'Peaceful Rise' edged into being 
China's response to a US-dominated world order which the Chinese leaders 
perceived to be favourable to Chinese developments, so that they harboured no 
intention of becoming an antagonistic challenger. Wang 1isi (2005: 15), Dean of 
the School of International Studies at Peking University, explains the rationale 
behind China's response this way: 'under the global hegemonic system built 
by the United States, there is still a quite large space for China to rise'. If any-
thing, all this seems to testify to 'a beneficial interactive relationship between 
1\merica's dove camp with a pragmatic China policy and the moderate foreign 
policy of the Chinese government' (Xiao Gongqin 2001: 46). 
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This kind of 'positive' interaction was also evident in the previous decade. 
For example, some scholars have suggested that China's change of self-per-
ception and worldview during Jiang Zemin's leadership had much to do with 
Jiang's meeting with Bill Clinton in 1998 as well as the smooth handover of 
Hong Kong the year before. Both experiences were very 'rewarding', in a 
subjective sense at least, for the Chinese leaders, which allegedly fuelled 
Beijing's desire to join the game of formulating international norms (Shi 
2005: 763). Indeed, even in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, US 
engagement efforts did not stop. Shortly after the dramatic events in June, 
US President George H. W Bush secretly sent his National Security Advisor 
Brent Scowcroft to Beijing to convey Washington's hope that China's pre-
Tiananmen policy of reform would continue. 'President Bush still regards 
you as his friend, a friend forever', Scowcroft reportedly told Deng Xiaoping 
on 11 December 1989 (Mirsky 1990: 21). In response, Deng praised the visit, 
and expressed his confidence that Sino-US relations would improve in the 
long run. A few months after the visit, Deng made the following sanguine 
assessment of China's international environment at the time: 'We should not 
think that the situation has deteriorated seriously or that we are in a very 
unfavourable position. Things are not so bad as they seem. In this world 
there are ... contradictions that we can use, conditions that are favourable to 
us, opportunities that we can take advantage of' (Deng Xiaoping 1990). In a 
word, Deng believed that peace and deVelopment remained the order of the 
day. It is hard to know the precise extent to which US engagement actually 
contributed to Deng's continued faith in 'peace and deVelopment' as the 
main themes of the international system. Yet it is fair to propOse that 
Washington's prompt reassurance and continued engagement significantly 
helped the cause of neoliberal reform in China. 
International institutiolls 
. Apart from Washington's engagement policy, the role of international insti~ 
tutions is also worth noting. International norms reside in an array of 
transnational actors, but international institutions are likely the most pow-
erful standard-bearers in international society. Despite a wide array of rules 
and norms, international institutions are commonly characterised by their 
prescriptions of normative boundaries to distinguish unacceptable from 
acceptable state behaviour. Thus the socialisation of states as "responsible' 
members of the international community is a primary function of most 
international institutions. A case in point here is the ASEAN (Association of 
South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), which is regarded by 
many ARF participants as 'a tool for socializing China to accept the legiti-
macy of multilateralism, transparency and reassurance as a basis for security' 
(Johnston 2003: 126). 
Now that China is part of most international economic, security and 
human rights regimes, the 'socialising' influence of international institutions 
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on China has become more clearly identifiable. As Samuel Kim (1994: 433) 
observes, 'In varying ways and degrees international organisations shortened 
[the] Chinese global learning curve'. Similarly, in their study of the role of 
multilateral economic institutions (MEIs) in China, Thomas Moore and 
Dixia Yang (2001: 194) argue that in an effort to 'transmit the principles and 
rules of economic liberalism to China ... MEls have served as a significant 
source of domestic and foreign policy change in China'. 
Beijing's engagement with those institutions has not always been a smooth 
ride. Nevertheless, once inside, for the most part it has seemingly come to 
accept relevant international norms, develop vested interests in maintaining 
the international system, and at times modify its interests and preferences 
along the way. The net effect is that, although Chinese leaders often called 
for the establishment of 'a fair and reasonable new international political 
and economic order', in practice they seemed to have become increasingly 
status quo players in the international economic system. Ann Kent (1997/8: 
132) suggests that China's growing participation in international organisa-
tions is clearly 'a measure of its increased global commitments and respon-
sibility'. Thomas Moore (2005: 145) also notes that 'however dissatisfied 
China may be with various inequities in the international economic system, 
it seeks neither to undermine specific regimes nor to weaken their norms in 
any substantial way'. He goes on to say that, 'while China still pursues its 
own interests, this pursuit of self-interest leads Beijing to accept policies that 
entail unprecedented levels of interdependence' (Moore 2005: 149). 
China's accession to the WTO again provides a good example of this 
metamorphosis. Even before the eventual entry, the negotiation process had 
already led Beijing to 'change its self-image to one that reflected more what 
other great powers expected of China, than a proactive image that grew out 
of China's own conscious quest for re~ognition as a great power' (Shi 2005: 
758). Another example can be found in Beijing's changing attitude towards 
the Group of Eight (G8). Realising that it is the 'beneficiary' of economic 
globalisation and the current international order, the Chines~ state has now 
sought to gradually integrate with G8 countries, selectively participate in G8 
discussions and undertake international responsibility in accordance with its 
status and practical interests (Jiang Yong 2006). The point is not that the 
Chinese state would not cooperate or behave responsibly in the absence of 
the 'socialisation' effect of international institutions, but that the way in 
which international cooperation and responsibility are defined within China 
is, and has been, increasingly influenced by the predominantly Western 
international institutions. 
IntematiOllal NGOs and academia 
To fully understand this 'learning' process, it is now necessary to turn to a 
third kind of liberal transnational actor, namely international non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and academia in largely Western societies. 
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These--' actors frequently operate alongside state and formal institutional 
actors, but as innovators, proliferators and unofficial reinforcers of 'interna-
tional norms' in a transnational society they have played distinctive roles in 
'socialising' China or segments of Chinese society into the international 
community. According to China Development Brief, there are now over 200 
International NGOs operating in the country. This is in addition to a grow-
ing presence of NGOs on Chinese-language websites. For instance, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an influential US-based lib-
eral think-tank, recently opened both its Chinese-language website and its 
office in Beijing. 
Given the growing presence of international NGOs, it is not surprising 
that since the 1990s their influence on China's internalisation of international 
norms has been steadily on the rise. Rosemary Foot (2000) explains, for 
example, how NGOs have influenced Chinese attitudes towards human rights, 
particularly through shaming human rights abusers. In other cases, some orga-
nisations foster so-called 'epistemic communities' in China through promot-
ing scholafIy exchanges. As early as 1979, the Ford Foundation identified 
three areas (international relations, economics and law) for support in scho-
larly exchanges between the US and China (Zhang 2003: 101). Through its 
International Fellowships Program, the Ford Foundation sponsored a total 
of more than 168 candidates from 24 Chinese provinces to continue post-
graduate study overseas. And since the opening of its Beijing office in 1988, 
the Foundation has made grants totalling about US$206 million, sponsoring 
numerous projects in areas ranging from economics, educational reform, 
governance and public policy to civil society and international cooperation 
(Industry Updates 2006). 
Like international NGOs, Western scholars, through their work, are also 
important agents for China's new 'peace' commitment. Take the field of 
international relations (IR), for example: in recent years, there has been an 
explosion in the number of Western books being translated and published in 
Chinese. Today, nearly a dozen leading Chinese publishers are geared up in a 
race to bring even more Western IR literature to the Chinese audience.5 As 
those books make their way to China, so do their theoretical frameworks 
and concepts, inevitably affecting the ways the Chinese come to perceive the 
world. Even with a cursory search through Chinese IR journals and articles, 
one can easily run into largely favourable discussions of such concepts as 
'interdependence' (xianghu yicun), 'responsible power' (ju zeren de daguo) , 
'international norms' (guoji gui/an), 'democratic peace' (minzhu heping), 'global 
governance' (quanqiu zhili), 'multilateralism' (duobian zhuyi) and 'con-
structivism' (goujian zhuyi). Given the apparent American/Western origins of 
those concepts, this seems to confirm what Shaun Breslin (2002: 7) describes 
as 'the over-dependence on the US as a source of ideas' in the Chinese IR 
community. And the field of international relations is just a microcosm of 
the growing influence of international NGOs and scholars on China's chan-
ging perceptions of the world. 
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Of course, not all the normative influences from transnational actors have 
been welcomed by the Chinese government. After the 'colour' revolutions in 
Central Asia, and for fear that its political legitimacy might be undermined 
by the NOOs' activities, Beijing has acted swiftly to put restrictions on both 
local and international NOOs. Yet, just as China's economic rise and the 
state's increased legitimacy cannot be separated from transnational actors, its 
commitment to becoming a 'peaceful', 'responsible' power has been in large 
measure influenced by the abovementioned transnational actors and norma-
tive structures which they constitute - thus supplying some degree of war-
ranty of their continuous interactions with domestic Chinese state and social 
actors. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have dealt with a much-debated topic in China's interna-
tional relations, 'Peaceful Rise'. In doing so, however, I did not follow the 
conventional route of examining 'Peaceful Rise' within foreign policy para-
meters. Rather, I am interested more in understanding how 'Peaceful Rise' 
reveals a state in change, and how such change has come into being. 
'Peaceful Rise', as I have argued, represents a new social contract being 
'written' between the Chinese state and transnational actors. With this new 
contract, the Chinese state is changing in terms of both how it defines its 
responsibility and how it legitimises itself. From a state-in-society perspec-
tive, those changes cannot be fully understood unless we locate them in a 
transnational social context. As I have illustrated, transnational actors have 
played important roles in both China's rise and its commitment to peace. 
Thus I argue that they, together with domestic actors within the Chinese 
state and society, are responsible for the emergence of the new international 
contract in the Chinese state. 
The chapter has not directly addressed the implications of China's peace-
ful rise for global politics; the ways in which China's change has been effec-
ted in transnational society does have an important bearing on our 
understanding of China's international implications, nevertheless. So long as 
the Chinese leadership continues to place a premium on domestic stability 
and political legitimacy, Chinese foreign policy is more likely than not to 
reflect this domestic priority. Indeed, as manifes.ted in the declaration of 
'Peaceful Rise', a regime that relies partly on the international community 
for legitimacy can ill afford to behave irresponsibly in the international 
realm. Thus the new international contract, while revealing many of the 
dynamics of China's change process, is useful also for assessing the global 
implications of China's rise, which might well have begun to depart from the 
pattern of earlier rising powers. 
The focus on largely liberal transnational actors in this discussion does not 
imply that these are the only actors that matter. Certainly domestic actors 
and processes have a large role, and their interactions with transnational 
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actors are an important part of the story - dimensions that are beyond the 
scope of this current analysis. Bearing this in mind, we are not surprised that 
the formation, and future trajectory, of the new international contract as 
reflected in 'Peaceful Rise' has not been, and will not be, a smooth, unilinear 
development. What China is and how it (re)writes its contract with the out-
side world always depend on how a variety of actors, 'domestic' and other-
wise, interact and negotiate in the (re )production of the Chinese state as a 
fluid social construct. This chapter, hopefully, has captured a glimpse of a 
part of the processes involved. 
Notes 
'Peaceful Rise' was later modified to 'peaceful development' (heping fazhan). 
Despite the modified wording, the basic teneL does not seem to have changed. If 
anything, the change from 'rise' to the more modest word 'development' only 
highlights China's growing sensitivity to its image in the international community. 
For the sake of analytical convenience, I will use 'Peaceful Rise' to refer to both 
terms in this chapter. 
2 In this chapter, the notion 'social contract' is used in a loose sense. It therefore 
does not imply that there are two formal, independent parties to the 'new inter-
national contract', nor that the 'contract' is struck as a result of equal consent. 
3 The idea of 'Three Represents' was put forward by former CCP General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin in Febmary 2000. It states that the CCP must always represent 'the 
development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of 
China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese people'. 
4 On a personal note, when I studied International Relations at Peking University 
in the late 1980s, the undergraduate subject of 'international relations theory' was 
taught by an American called Wilson (I can't remember his first name), While he 
taught little theory during his class except showing us Hollywood movies 
throughout the semester, one of the few textbooks he gave us was (oddly) Hayek's 
Road to Serfdom. 
5 For example, Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe (Shanghai People's Press), Shijie 
Zhishi Chubanshe (World Affairs Press), Changzheng Chubanshe (Long March 
Press), Beijingdaxue Chubanshe (Peking University Press) and Zhejiang Renmin 
Chubanshe (Zhejiang People's Press) all have published series in international 
studies and international relations theories. See Wang Yizhou (2003: 10). 
